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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of access to durable economic assets,
education and occupational opportunities on political inclusion. The study uses
aggregated cross sectional data from the DHS surveys and combines it with data from the
EPR dataset to obtain measures of economic, social and political inequalities at the group
level. The study assumes that the more economic deprivation would lead to reduced
political inclusion, whereas increased share of access to education and modern
occupations increase the likelihood of political inclusion. The main findings of the study
suggest a negative relation between relative economic deprivation and moderns
occupation (clerical…) on political inclusion, whereas a positive relation between
education and political inclusion.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The continuous struggle of different ethnic groups around the world suggests that they
experience deeper social and economic grievances as guiding framework to have more
equal society by all necessary means. The uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East
in 2011 show that to sustain a political regime there should be a minimum level of
fairness and social justice experienced by the different groups of the society (Cederman,
Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013, p. 1), at the objective level, which corresponds to groups’
real conditions and subjective level, which corresponds to the perceived status by the
different groups. The main drivers to these uprisings were of primary inspiration to this
research along with the different implications of the various economic, social and
structural arrangements.
Over the past decades, the studies of applied social sciences have been closely linked to
behavioral studies across various fields. For instance, economists and political scientists
have been recognizing that to study the implications of the different economic, social and
structural adjustments, it is necessary to pay attention to the mechanisms of decisionmaking processes and communication strategies that guide the different interacting units
of societies. Similarly, policy analysts are being more concerned with studying how the
different regulations result in altering the behavior of individuals by incentivizing and/or
demotivating certain actions. The human agency has thus been able to place itself as a
core focal point for analysis in most fields of study.
Yet at the same time, the ongoing debate between individual’s agency and how it reflects
human capacity, free will and rational choice on one hand, and social structure on the
other hand, and how it reflects the limitations and constraints that guide human behavior
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and practice, has never come to an end. Similarly, the existing dichotomy between
autonomy and how it is reflected in individualism, against collective action, continue to
emerge in almost all social sciences critiques and analyses, especially those examining
different notions of fairness, wellbeing and political stability.
This tension between individual and collective rationality mostly prevails when scholars
attempt to examine major collective actions ranging from activities of voluntary and
participatory democratization, passing by violent mob actions, reaching both intra and
inter state wars and armed conflicts. Throughout their continuous inquiry, over the past
decades, scholars and policy analysts have also come up with different models and
theories to explain collective action behavior and mobilization of the different groups.
Among these theories are the structural theory of ethnic mobilization, the rational choice
theory and the social identity model of collective action.
The structural theory assumes that when the members of ethnic groups occupy different
and disadvantaged positions in any structural category, such as class and labor market,
and when they become aware of their disadvantageous situation, collective action and
mobilization will evidently follow (Hechter, Friedman, & Appelbaum, 1982).
However, the main critique addressed to this category of theories is that it does not
account for the non-occurrence of collective action and ethnic mobilization in many
instances where ethnic structural and differential stratification exists. It thus only helps to
explain the desirability of collective action and not its actual occurrence. It also ignores a
very important feature of all collective actions and that is at the end, any action that
happens for the pursuit of collective goals, is done by individuals (Hechter, Friedman, &
Appelbaum, 1982).
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In an attempt to solve for the shortcomings of the structural theory, the rational choice is
proposed. This theory advocates that individuals have different goals and utilities. And
since individuals cannot pursue all their goals due to the scarcity of resources, they have
to make rational choices between alternatives to maximize their utilities and welfare,
which are limited by a set of structural constraints. The major premise of this theory is
that individuals will only participate in collective actions when the benefits attributed to it
outweigh the costs of participation (Hechter, Friedman, & Appelbaum, 1982)
A critical dimension to the rational choice theory is the presence of ethnic organizations
that governs the distribution of costs and benefits across the different individuals through
private rewards and punishments in an attempt to solve for free riding. The free-rider
dilemma acts as a main obstacle for collective actions as it could demotivate rational
individuals to participate in collective action and mobilization, knowing that they could
benefit from the end results of the collective production of public goods and goals
without paying the adequate costs (Hechter, Friedman, & Appelbaum, 1982)
In an attempt to go further beyond the analysis of individual cost-benefit analysis, and to
examine the factors that influence the valuation of these costs and outcomes that governs
the individual’s calculations, Zomeren et al. (2008)proposes the integrative social identity
model of collective action to incorporate in the analysis the socio-psychological
determinants of collective action. In this model, the three subjective variables that affect
collective actions are perceived injustice, perceived efficacy and the strong sense of
social identity. Perceived injustice shifts the attention from studying the consequences of
objective inequality to studying the consequences of its subjective experience because it
is believed that the latter carries greater weight than the material origins of the former and
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a perceived sense of deprivation could be a strong motivator for collective action (van
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). This variable could thus be seen as an added and
enriching dimension to the structural theory.
As for perceived efficacy, it pertains to the subjective expectancy that a certain collective
action will be successful and effective in bringing about the desired goals (van Zomeren,
Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Again, this shift from objective cost-benefit analysis to
subjective perceptions of efficacy is an added value to the rational choice theory.
As for the social identity element, its integration proposes that people generally seek to
pursue a positive social identity associated with their membership groups; it thus serves
to mobilize people for social change. A strong sense of social identity helps to shift the
focus onto strong group-based emotions (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).
Along the same line of thought with the social identity model of collective action, was the
evolution of concepts such as social capital and how it matters to new economic and
political development theories. Individuals invest in building social networks to grant
them power and solidarity and to strengthen their collective identity in order to increase
their capacity for collective action. In other words, social capital could be thought as a
transformative channel that lies on the grounds of normative commitments that serves to
transform individuals from self-seeking agents with little sense of obligation to others
into community members with shared interests, a common identity, and a commitment to
the common good (Adler & Kwon, 2002). The cultural affinities of the groups are
therefore an important pillar for the formation of social capital. It is therefore important
to pay attention to the norms and believes that serve to gather a community and form the
boundaries of groups. In fact, it is often argued that the diffusion and authority of norms
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and believes shape the choices of individuals in the smaller aggregate groups and
communities in their continuous efforts to renegotiate their places within the larger
aggregate, i.e. society (Adler & Kwon, 2002).As mentioned earlier by Stewart, these
cultural identities have an important influence on the behavior of both individuals and
groups. They affect how others treat individuals within groups and also affect their
overall wellbeing (Stewart, 2002).
For the purpose of this research, group identification is based on economic, education,
and occupation opportunities that coincide with cultural differences and ethnicity. Often,
the argument prevails that ethnic identities that are based on race, language, religion,
tribal affiliation or even regional differences could serve as effective binder for the
purposes of group formation. In fact, ethnicity is considered as a superior basis for group
formation as compared to social class for instance (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2007). In
addition, we believe that the wealth ownership and types of occupations along with
access to education can identify the ethnic inequality as consequence of marginalization.
The main hypothesis driving this research is that one of the most important factors that
differentiate between the different ethnic groups’ wellbeing and motivate their different
behaviors is the presence of deep inequalities between them, in terms of access to
political, economic and social resources. As implied by the concept of social capital and
the integrative social identity model, since the individuals positions, merits and selfesteem are bound with the progress of the groups to which they belong by social and
cultural networks as well as identities, the presence of such inequalities reduce the
individuals’ welfare within the deprived groups. The members of a deprived and
discriminated group are thus expected to have a networking disadvantage accompanied
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with economic and social implications. This results from the notion that the individual
welfare does not only depend on the individual’s own circumstances, but it is also linked
to the prestige and attributed merit of the group to which she/he identifies (Stewart, 2002)
In such cases, the perception of such inequalities can have an important effect on the
groups’ behaviors with respect to their mobilization and collective actions, which could
in turn lead to a wide range of political instabilities. These political disturbances could
take the form of riots organized by the deprived groups or they could take a more extreme
form of mobilizations such as civil wars between the different competing groups. In fact,
in many cases, it is not only the resentment of the deprived groups that could result in
political instabilities, but the relatively privileged could also mobilize. In these cases, the
privileged is motivated by fear that the deprived would demand and seek access for more
resources, economical and political (Stewart, 2002).
The main aim of this study is to focus on the extent of impact of economic, social
inequalities on political inequalities among culturally and economically defined ethnic
groups, since a better understanding of such relationship provides an opportunity to
discuss the different aspects of history and/or political choices that have resulted into the
creation of such differences within the multi-ethnic societies. It further facilitates a better
understanding of the concept of inter-group inequalities developed as a driving motive for
the collective choices and behaviors of the different ethnic groups. This interrelation is
better explained by Cramer’s (2003)argument stating that economic inequalities exist by
virtue of social and political forces that give rise to it, just as materials forces shape the
social and political. In other words, economic inequalities are embedded and structured
by the historical and social milieu (Muhula, 2009).
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Research Question
The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of economic, education and
employment opportunities on political inequalities among culturally defined ethnic
groups. More specifically, the study attempts to examine the effect of particular ethnic
group’s access to durable economic assets, education, and employment, on the
probability of its political inclusion.
For the purpose of this research, political inclusion refers only to the degree of access to
central state power by the different political ethnic groups and those who claim to
represent them. This research, following the available data sources that will be elaborated
in Chapter 3, limits state power to the access to executive power only, disregarding
access to legislative and judicial institutions. Examples of executive power institutions
that are examined to categorize the political inclusion include: “the presidency, the
cabinet, and senior posts in the administration in democratic regimes; the army command
in military dictatorships; or the ruling party leadership in one-party states” (Vogt, 2014).
The existing interrelations between horizontal inequalities in multiethnic societies are
studied, as an attempt to examine the multidimensionality of the horizontal inequalities.
Significance
The significance of this research is twofold, theoretical and practical. From the theoretical
part, since the concept of the horizontal inequalities among groups is relatively new, this
research strengthen the notions of existing and persistent inter-group inequalities by
focusing on the different dimensions of inequalities, particularly political and socioeconomic, among different ethnic groups.
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In fact, most of the literature attempts to separately examine the consequences of the
different dimension of horizontal inequalities, by focusing on the link between political
or socio-economic inequalities and conflict onset and civil wars duration. However, this
research takes a step back and attempts to examine the dynamics of wealth, employment
and education opportunities on inequalities. This study contributes to the quantitative
literature on horizontal inequalities and social exclusion. It attempts to carefully examine
the interrelations and correlations existing between the different dimensions of horizontal
inequalities leading to social exclusion. It adopts the multidimensional approach
advocated for the analysis of both concepts, as will be shown in Chapter 2, by attempting
to examine the effect of social and economic opportunities, in the form of access to
durable assets, education and occupation on political opportunities, in the form of
political inclusion and access to executive power. As will be shown later in Chapter 3, the
study relies on aggregating data from DHS surveys in a way that helps in assessing the
differential status of the different ethnic groups in developing countries. It also combines
the comprehensive EPR dataset with the DHS survey.
As for the practical part, by studying such interrelations among inequalities, this research
will serve to identify a measure of corrective policies and regulations intended to resolve
such structural inequalities and discrepancies at the group level.
The study proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 discusses theoretical literature review that
highlights the main guiding theories of the research and analysis. Chapter 3 presents the
research design, with the study’s argument and hypothesis, the sample, data sources and
operationalization of the different variables used in the analysis. Chapter 4 presents the
empirical analysis of the different models used to test the study’s hypothesis. Finally,
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Chapter 5 concludes with some closing remarks and briefly discusses the added value of
this study and the implications for future research along with some brief policy
recommendations.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Multiethnic Societies
The importance of cultural ethnicity has been highlighted over the past decades in many
instances in social sciences. As it is observed, instead of abandoning traditional ethnic
identities for the search for socio-economic and political equity, ethnic groups have
retained their identities along the way and irrespective of their political economic status.
Increasingly, political and economic strife is defined along ethno-religious lines. (Scott,
1990). After years of social mobility and migration, people of different cultures have
become closer to each other in terms of physical proximity. These culture differences
have been accounting for most of the current conflicts and societal disorders that are
taking place (Stewart, 2002).
In the literature, there are basically two types of multiethnic societies that differ in terms
of inter-ethnic group relations. According to Horowitz, ethnic groups are ranked into two
types (Horowitz, 1985). In the first type of multiethnic societies, ethnicity is represented
in historically hierarchical power structures where one group dominates others. In the
second type, “ethnicity constitutes the politically relevant cleavage between different
groups that meet each other on a relatively equal footing” (Vogt, 2013). While ethnicity
is employed to practice constant oppression and stabilize the state of inequality in the first
type of societies, in the latter type it creates a competitive sense of ethno-nationalism
accompanied by an alternating dominance over the society, resulting in fluctuating
inclusion and exclusion arrangements (Vogt, 2013).
Horowitz’ (1985) conceptualization is based on the coincidence and non-coincidence of
social class with ethnic origins. In ranked systems, the state of being divided into social

10

classes is identical to group membership, and group affiliations determine the possibility
of social class mobility. (Horowitz, 1985, p. 22). On the other hand, unranked systems are
marked by the coexistence of different parallel ethnic groups, which are internally
divided (Horowitz, 1985, p. 23).
Ethnicity
We now move to the different conceptualizations of ethnicity and ethnic identity in the
literature. Three main views guide the exact conceptualization of ethnicity: the
primordialist view, the instrumentalist view and the constructionist view. For the
primordialist, ethnicity is a cultural given. According to Anthony D. Smith (1984), sociobiological factors define ethnicity, making it a “quasi-natural matter of descent.”
According to Horowitz, an inclusive conception of ethnicity embraces differences
identified by color, language, religion, or some other attribute of common origin
(Horowitz, 1985, p. 41). It is based on collective ancestry, which usually carries with it
traits believed to be innate (Horowitz, 1985, p. 52). It cannot be discarded by social
mobility, as in the case of social classes for instance (Bacal, 1991). It thus follows that
ethnicity is both ascribed and static (Yang, 2000, p. 42). In this view ethnic affiliations
are highly emotionally charged and, on some accounts, irrational (Østby, 2003).
According to Persons (1999), there is a socio-psychological aspect to the primordial
perspective, which sustains group solidarity, and which provides answers to essentialist
questions pertaining to identity. Thereby, ethnicity sets the boundaries differentiating
between one’s group and the others (Persons, 1999, p. 7). One main critique of the
primordialist view is that it does not account for the change of ethnic groups over time.
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Similarly, this view does not explain why the boundaries of the ethnic groups change
(Stewart, 2002; Scott, 1990).
As for the instrumentalist view, it views ethnicity as an instrument or tool for gaining
resources (Yang, 2000, p. 46). In this view, ethnic motivation and behavior are
structurally determined and correspond to objective and adaptive socio-economic
interests (Bacal, 1991). Group leaders and elites thus advocate ethnicity in order to
achieve certain interests (Stewart, 2002) and it is greatly affected by the rights,
opportunities and the distribution of power resources as determined deferentially by the
rules of the game in a given social setting (Persons, 1999, p. 7). In other words, ethnic
groups are also interest groups. The instrumentalist approach is inspired from the rational
choice theory, which advocates that people act to promote their socioeconomic positions.
In this view, ethnicity is nothing more than an option (Yang, 2000, p. 47). However, it
has to be noted that it has often been argued that these different perspectives and
approaches to conceptualize ethnicity are not mutually exclusive. In concrete behavioral
contexts, we can expect to find cultural, social and strategic elements at play (Douglass,
1988; Scott, 1990)
As for the constructionist view, it is considered a midway approach between both
instrumentalist and primordial approaches. It holds that ethnicity is socially constructed,
without implying prerequisites of deep cultural ties (Persons, 1999, p. 7). Thereof, it is
the result of historical and political processes. Constructionists argue that ethnicity is
neither immutable nor completely open; it is not an individual attribute but a social
phenomenon. In other words, a person’s culture is partly inherited, but also constructed
and chosen, with many people having multiple identities (Østby, 2003). Much of the
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work of the constructionist view has been developed to respond to the primordialist
critique mentioned above, by showing that some of the social categories, which have
been taken for granted, have indeed changed over time (Fearon & Laitin, 2000). From
that perspective, ethnic solidarity results from certain social circumstances, or rather
changing or differential circumstances, both internal and external, under which the group
exists. In that sense, ethnicity is dynamic (Yang, 2000, p. 44) and ethnic boundaries may
be defended, penetrated, or ignored depending upon situational exigencies (Douglass,
1988). Yet the primordialists argue that while constructionists would be able to account
for the change of ethnic identity over time, they would not be able to account for its
persistence, which could last for centuries. In other words, “changing circumstances
could explain the fluctuations, but only primordial sentiments can account for its
persistence” (Scott, 1990).
Group membership, social capital and intergroup relations
It thus follows that an inherent and fundamental part of human life is group membership.
It is in fact a part of what defines individual identities. As stated by Gellner (1964),
human beings have an instinctive need for a sense of belonging, identification, and
exclusion. From this notion of belonging and exclusion come boundaries of the different
ethnic groups, which have an important influence on the behavior of both individuals and
groups (Stewart, 2002). Often the argument prevails that the various ethnic markers, like
race, language, religion, form a strong ground for group identification. In fact, ethnicity is
considered a superior basis for group formation compared to social class for instance
(Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2007). The importance of group affiliation has been highlighted
in many theories, most importantly theories of social capital and intergroup relations.
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Social capital results from a strong sense of community, which brings together people
over common interests. As elaborately mentioned by Adler and Kwon (2002), “social
capital . . . has informed the study of families, youth behavior problems, schooling and
education, public health, community life, democracy and governance, economic
development and general problems of collective action”. In order to achieve this status of
collective action, individuals invest in building social networks to grant them power and
solidarity and to strengthen their collective identity in order to increase their capacity for
future actions. Social capital tends to conceptualize the networking strategies that explain
trust, cultural, social support, social resources and embeddedness. The cultural affinities
of the groups are therefore an important pillar for the formation of social capital. It is thus
important to pay attention to the norms and believes that serve to gather a community and
form the boundaries of groups (Adler & Kwon, 2002).
Group affiliation and categorization is also important for theories of intergroup behavior,
especially theories of intergroup conflict. According to Tajfel and Turner (1979), a group
is conceptualized as a group of individuals who assign themselves to a certain social
category and are emotionally attached to this collective definition. As a result, they also
share common perceptions, to varying extents, of their group status. It is the social
categorization that acts as a cognitive tool to segment, classify and order the surrounding
environment, which enables the individuals to undertake many forms of social actions.
The argument that social categorization provides the roots for intergroup behavioral
analysis assumes the following: first, individuals aim at enhancing their self-esteem;
second, social groups and group affiliation can have either positive or negative
associations; third, the way members evaluate their own groups is usually affected by
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comparison against other groups in terms of social status. It thus follows, from that
perspective, that when social identity is negatively perceived and unsatisfactory,
individuals will attempt to either leave the group with which they are identified and join a
more positively perceived group, or make their existing group stand out (Tajfel & Turner,
1979). From that notion of intergroup comparisons, we can start to introduce the concept
of horizontal inequalities.
Horizontal Inequalities
It is true that some countries managed to avoid the cultural cleavage caused by the
different ethnic compositions. However, the post-colonial states in developing parts of
the world were remarkably vulnerable when it came to dealing with cultural divisions.
(Horowitz, 1985, p. 6). Both diffused and announced importance of ethnic affiliations and
tendencies in multiethnic societies find their way in many evident aspects including
developmental plans, educational controversies, land policy and so on. The importance of
ethnicity is also reflected in the organizational structures of many multiethnic societies
where ethnic affiliation guides the structure of economic and political organizations. In
addition, capital and labor are often organized along ethnic lines. Political life in societies
that are deeply influenced by ethnic division inevitably suffers ethnic repercussions. In
such societies, governments tend to adopt discriminating policies that work in favor of
some groups over others. Gradually, the adopted polices shape a differential economic
system that operates strictly under these terms. Ethnic cleavage in divided societies has
become a principal line of political division to the extent that it creates and fosters other
cleavages (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 12-13).
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As defined by Stewart (2002), horizontal inequalities are severe inequalities between
culturally defined groups. Stewart adopts the term horizontal inequalities to set it apart
from the conventional definitions of inequality, which maintain a vertical arrangement for
individuals or households, and measures inequality across groups. Horizontal inequalities
generally have their origins in historic circumstances, where colonial policy privileged
some groups over others. Initial advantages led to long-term cumulative advantages, as
resources and education allow the more privileged groups to secure further advantages
(Stewart, 2003). Gurr (2000), however, proposes that group discrimination may be the
result of either public policy practices or social practices. In the latter case, social
prejudices and barriers in multi-ethnic societies could have a net effect that restricts some
groups’ access to education, public services and good jobs, and limit their participation in
the political life (Gurr, 2000, p. 107). Indeed, and as clarified by Sen (1992), ethnic
affinity can be a factor with far-reaching influence on many aspects of day-to-day
living—varying from securing employment and receiving medical attention to being
fairly treated by the police (Sen, 1992, p. 122). For instance, In South Africa under
apartheid nonwhites were excluded from most skilled and professional occupations
(Østby, 2003).
For Stewart, horizontal inequalities are multidimensional. She specified three categories
of differentiation, in terms of inclusion and exclusion: First, the political participation in
terms of access to government ministries, parliament and different levels of civil service
and local government as well. Second, the economic aspects, in terms of access to the
different assets, such as land, human capital, communal resources, privately owned
capital and credit, government infrastructure and so on, in addition to differentiation in
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terms of employment and income opportunities. Third, she classifies the aspects of social
inclusion and exclusion, in terms of access to education, health services and housing and
so on (Stewart, 2002).
Furthermore, Stewart and Langer (2007)argue that horizontal inequalities among groups
tend to persist over long periods of time, especially where group markers and boundaries
are rigid and tend to continue existing with time, as in the case of ethnicity. In addition,
this persistence is explained by the notion of multidimensionality and interactions among
the different categories of horizontal inequalities and the different elements within each
of the categories. For instance, the outcome of income and economic inequalities cause
political and social inequalities (Stewart & Langer, 2007).
Horizontal inequalities are similar in meaning and essence to what Tilly (1999) called
“categorical durable inequalities”, which are inequalities that exist between distinctly
joint categories such as female/male, citizen/foreigner. But it also extends to more
complex classifications based on religion affiliation, ethnic origin or race (Tilly, 1999, p.
6). He highlighted two mechanisms for the durability of such inequalities. The first is
exploitation by powerful people, who use their leverage to gain access to resources that
generate great profits. This is typically done through capitalizing on the effort exerted by
the very ones who are excluded by those in power. The second mechanism is opportunity
hoarding, where access to a key resource is exclusively monopolized by one of the
aforementioned categories to reinforce the operations of the group. (Tilly, 1999, p. 10)
Horizontal inequalities are also similar to what Gurr and Scarritt (1989)referred to as
systematic differential treatment of group members by the larger society. They are also
similar to socially embedded inequalities as referred to by Mogues and Carter (2005),
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meaning that the wealthy and poor are distinguished not only by their assets, but also by
their culture, language or appearance (Mogues & Carter, 2005)
There are two categories of reasons for which the study of horizontal inequalities
between groups is important, both instrumentally, as means of achieving other objectives,
and in themselves for the well-being of individuals and groups respectively—especially
when the determinants of group affiliations are tight and less fluid, as is the case with
ethnicity. The later direct welfare reasons are easily conceptualized as what happens to
the group to which an individual belongs may have a direct effect on the individual’s
welfare. That is because individual welfare depends not only on a person’s own
circumstances, but also the prestige and wellbeing of the group with which they identify
(Stewart, 2002). This reasoning is similar to the assumptions arranged by Tajfel and
Turner (1979) in attempting to conceptualize social categorization and group
comparisons, as shown earlier. In fact, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have included a
person’s identity in the individual’s utility function arguing that a person assigned a
category with a higher social status may enjoy an enhanced self-image. One may consider
that a person’s sense of self is associated with different social categories and how people
in these categories should behave. In addition, in a world of social difference, one of the
most important economic decisions that an individual makes may be the type of person to
be. It thus follows that limits on this choice would also be critical determinants of
economic behavior, opportunity, and wellbeing (Akerflof & Kranton, 2000). This
conclusion goes in line with Hoff and Pandey’s (2006) when they concluded that a
discriminatory regime affects not only the structure of opportunities open to the different
social groups, but also the status and social meanings assigned to those groups; in other
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words, their social identities (Hoff & Pandey, 2006). In accordance with this line of
thought, Loury (2000) identifies different reasons to care explicitly about group
inequalities. One of them is that race and ethnicity influence the social networks open to
individuals, and these networks have a major effect on individuals’ opportunities. In other
words, factors like race, ethnicity and religious affiliations affect the individual’s choice
of association with the different networks of affiliation. In addition, the different
processes through which individuals develop their productive capabilities are often
shaped by custom, convention and social norms. They are not exclusively subject to
market forces or reflective of the individual’s capabilities. This highlights the importance
of the role played by the social networks in mediating the effects of such market
imperfections and negative externalities, as they help determine how resources important
to the development of people’s productive capacities are made available to individuals
(Loury, 2000).
There are several instrumental reasons that lie behind the relevance of horizontal
inequalities between groups, including the efficiency reason. Any system in which a
group is discriminated against is likely to lead to less efficient outcomes than nondiscriminating systems, in terms of both equity and market allocations. That is because
severe mean that some people do not have access to education or jobs on the basis of
their potential merit or efficiency because of the group they belong to (Stewart & Langer,
2007). Furthermore, there is the reason of social stability, the link between horizontal
inequalities and the potential of violent conflict (Stewart, 2002).
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Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict
Armed conflicts disrupt infrastructure, markets and human resources (Ali & Lin, 2010).
Over the past decades, two theories have emerged attempting to explain conflict onset:
Greed and Grievance. Grievances theories perceive conflicts as motivated by justiceseeking collective behaviors (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2007)
From a psychological perspective, Ted Gurr (1970) has developed the theory of relative
deprivation, which perceives the different types of collective violence as reactions to
frustrations developed as result of a wide gap between aspirations and actual economic
status and material well being (Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011). As defined by
Ted Gurr (1970), relative deprivation is how individuals view the difference between
“their value expectations and their value capabilities.” Value expectations include
possessions and social statuses that people assume they justly qualify for. On the other
hand, value capabilities are the possessions and social statuses that people believe they
can actually acquire and maintain. Gurr (1970) proposes that the potential of collective
violence is a function of scope and intensity of shared discontents among members of a
society. By the extent of relative deprivation, Gurr (1970) means how much it prevails
over group member in terms of the perceived evaluation of expectations and capabilities.
For instance, individual and unexpected personal deprivation would affect fewer people
than would the suppression of a political party or the decline of a group’s status with
reference to others. As for intensity, Gurr (1970) refers to how the perception of
deprivation would negatively affect the members of the group, and the type of negative
emotions associated with it, like frustration, anger, or grievance etc. While developing
this theory, Gurr (1970) pointed out that relative deprivation cannot only be a matter of
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economic grievances, but can also derive from sudden exclusion or deprivation of
political standing or status. Thus elites who lose or fail to attain expected status or power
can also experience “relative deprivation” and harbor revolutionary discontents
(Goldstone, Gurr, Marshall, & Ulfelder, 2004).
In an attempt to overcome the individualistic approach undertaken by Gurr, Michael
Hetcher (1978) introduced the concept of “cultural division of labor,” which attempts to
explain the emergence of grievances when cultural differences coincide with
occupational exclusion. One other remarkable contribution to the literature is Horowitz’s
book Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985), which introduced theoretical arguments that
linked inequality and grievances to conflict through cognitive comparisons among the
different ethnic groups. By doing so, Horowitz analyzed power struggles that cannot be
solely reduced to material motivations (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013).
Greed is reflected by the work of Collier and Hoeffler (2004), in which they used a
comprehensive data set of civil wars. Their findings indicated that a model, which
focuses on the opportunities for rebellion, performs well, whereas objective indicators of
grievances—including inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization and religious
fractionalization—add little explanatory significance. Among the factors that they
highlighted influencing the opportunity of rebellion are the availability of finances, the
cost of rebellion, the weakness of the government’s capability and, finally, social
cohesion (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).Indeed, for “for any conflict to achieve its goals, the
prerequisites are not only to inflict high and sustainable damage but also to prevent the
military from utilizing its human and physical capital” (Ali, 2007).
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Snyder and Tilly (1972) also conceptualized conflicts as caused by opportunity-based
mobilization rather than grievances. From their perspective, since all societies have
frustrated individuals, it is thus unlikely to establish a connection between collective
violence and perceived “hardship” (Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011). Their
work could be considered the basis of Collier and Hoeffler’s findings.
Along the same line of thought, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that the factors that
explain civil wars are not the ethnic or religious characteristics of the respective
countries. They are, in fact, the conditions that favor rebellion; including poverty, slow
growth, and financially and bureaucratically weak states. These findings prove one set of
the theoretical explanation to conflict onset, which claim that the cultural differences are
superficial and instrumentalized in conflicts, and that the fundamental roots of a conflict
are to be found in economic (or political) factors (Stewart, 2010). However, it has to be
noted that while advocating that what matters to conflict is economic development and
political institutions, and after showing that colonial heritage and the ethnic composition
of a society have almost no effect on political stability, Goldstone et.al (2004) show that
when ethnic differences are combined with active political discrimination against
particular groups, political stability declines.
More recently, the literature has started to empirically substantiate the arguments in favor
of grievances mechanisms. Scholars have started to assert the major challenges of the
different methods used to assess horizontal inequalities and grievances.
The first problem encountered is how to determine the relevant groups within a country,
since this requires a study of people’s own perceptions of identity and of the linkages
between politics and group identities. The second problem is related to the lack of
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consistent and systematic data, which affects the accuracy of conceptualizing the group
disparities regarding the different elements of horizontal inequalities. For instance, data
related to socioeconomic inequalities are often very limited because ethno-cultural
variables are often not included in surveys. Also, gathering data regarding political
inequalities would require an assessment of the different groups’ distribution in the
different power branches. The third problem encountered is of a more technical nature,
and it is concerning how to measure group inequalities in a way that is comparable across
countries and over time (Langer & Stewart, 2013)
Stewart (2002)recognizes the challenges of measuring such horizontal inequalities and
resorts to individual case studies. She conducted an examination of different cases of
multiethnic societies using censuses and special surveys. Stewart contextualized the
measures of concern for each case study. In her analysis, she found that when ethnic
identities coincide with economic and social inequalities, there is a higher probability that
the country in question experiences social instability. As this happens, ethnic divisions
are enforced (Stewart, 2002).
Most recently, Ostby (2008) has introduced in her studies large sample quantitative
analysis, in order to find out the linkage between horizontal inequalities and grievances
on the one hand, and conflict onset on the other. She used national household data across
36 developing countries in the period from 1986 to 2004 (from the Demographic and
Health Surveys) to construct measures of social and economic horizontal inequalities.
Her analysis shows a positive relation between horizontal inequalities and conflict onset
(Østby, 2008).
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For a more direct assessment of the impact of horizontal inequalities among groups,
which are by definition multidimensional and aggregated, Cederman et.al (2011)had to
incorporate data on the relevant ethnic groups and their access to executive power. The
authors obtained spatial estimates of economic performance for EPR groups, by gathering
data on the distribution of economic activity and group settlement pattern within the
relevant countries. Their analysis shows a positive relation between economic and
political inequality and conflict onset (Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011).
Ethnic Political, Social and Economic Inequality and Capabilities Deprivation
Traps
Adopting an individualistic approach, Sen (1992) asked the important question: equality
of what? He first argues that principally focusing on economic inequality leads to further
conceptualization problems. He then argued that since living may be seen as a group of
operations pertaining to “beings and doings”, it thus follows that social arrangements
should be defined according to one’s capability to accomplish and sustain the presumably
valuable status. This should factor in how equality and inequality are conceptualized.
In her influential article Horizontal Inequalities: Two Types of Trap (2009), Stewart
criticized the individualistic approach adopted by Sen. She suggests that although the
space of capabilities is also relevant for the analysis of horizontal inequalities, it might be
more helpful to have a broader definition of capabilities. She first argues that there are
certain group capabilities that do not fit easily into the individualistic conceptualization of
capabilities like, for instance, group’s political power. Suffering from great deprivation in
terms of political power has extremely negative impacts on the affected groups, most
notably being unable to break this cycle of interrelated deprivation. Secondly, she argues
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that there is a need to conceptualize the notion of capabilities deprivation in terms of
inputs, such as access to education, and not only outcomes analysis that focuses on
functions (Stewart, 2009).
Stewart then elaborates on the mechanisms of interaction between the different
dimensions of horizontal inequalities, which result into the persistence of such
inequalities over time. The first mechanism is capability interaction, by which she means
the interactions between capabilities, which take place at a certain time, and extend over
the span of generations, creating “inequality traps”. For instance, parents with low health,
education and nutrition capabilities tend to have low-income earnings. This, in turn,
makes it difficult to provide for health, education and nutrition for their children. The
second mechanism is interactions among capitals, by which she implies that a
household’s income is determined by its ability to acquire various capital categories and
the ensuing benefits It has to be noted that both the mechanisms and the type of traps
enforce and strengthen each other, which again is related to the notion of
multidimensionality of inequalities among individuals and groups. Other factors, such as
asymmetries in the different capitals, especially social and cultural, along with systematic
discrimination and political exclusion, are expected to aggravate the persistence of
inequalities (Stewart, 2009).
Social Exclusion
It is important to pay attention to the concept of social exclusion in the literature, as it is
closely related to notions of deprivation and inequality traps. Social exclusion could be
defined as a state experienced by particular groups of people. It is viewed as a dynamic
and multidimensional process driven by unequal power relations. It is a concept that
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operates along and interacts across four main dimensions: economic, political, social and
cultural

dimensions.

These

exclusionary

processes

create

a

continuum

of

inclusion/exclusion, characterized by an unjust distribution of resources and unequal
access to the capabilities and rights (Popay, Escorel, Hernández, Johnston, Jane , &
Rispel , 2008).
Hilary Silver (1994) has introduced three different paradigms to conceptualize the
definition, including the causes and results of social exclusion: solidarity, specialization
and monopoly (Silver, 1994). In light of the first paradigm, social exclusion is defined as
the rupture of social bonds, which are primarily cultural and moral. This paradigm places
emphasis upon the existence of core shared values forming a moral community, around
which social order is constructed. In specialization—the second paradigm—exclusion
reflects discrimination, which implies the drawing of group distinctions that denies
individuals full participation in social interactions (De Haan, 2000). Discrimination in
that sense is conceptualized as a failure in the system of society, which is composed of
individuals who have certain rights and obligations. It is a failure in the structure of
society that is built around a division of labor and an exchange in economic and social
spheres (ILO, 1995).In the third paradigm, social exclusion is mainly driven by the
monopolization practiced by the powerful groups against others. (ILO, 1995). In this
paradigm, inequality overlaps with group distinctions (De Haan, 2000)
For this research, conceptualizing social exclusion as a sort of discrimination and a
mechanism of inequality is of important relevance. By this focus on the inter-relational
processes of exclusion and integration, the social exclusion framework serves to direct
attention to another fundamental question alongside with Sen’s questions “equality of
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what?” and that is: "equality amongst whom?" (ILO, 1995). In fact, Sen (2000)welcomes
the social exclusion framework. He argues that social exclusion may be directly a part of
capability poverty, in the sense that it is not only an integral part of capability
deprivation, but also an effective reason of further failure of capabilities.
Sen’s arguments is better understood when the different manifestations of social
exclusion are examined, which can be categorized within four dimensions. According the
UN, the first refers to the possession and ownership of different assets. The second
examines the course of acquiring and maintaining those assets, through taking part in
productive economic activities. The third dimension pertains to providing the essential
social needs, without compromising quality and levels of access. Finally, the fourth
dimension relates to the political and socio-economic rights, which constitute the base for
equal citizenship. This dimension if highly constrained by discriminating policies, and
the institutional framework that governs decision-making (UN, 2009).
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Chapter 3: Research Design
Study’s Argument and Hypothesis
The argument in the study is that in multiethnic societies the different dimensions of
horizontal inequalities across the different ethnic groups, namely political, economic and
social are interrelated. They are closely linked to the different dimensions of the social
exclusion approach. This interrelation is clarified by the notion of the vicious cycle of
deprivation, as explained by Stewart (2010), when arguing that each type of inequality is
notable in itself, but also has wide reaching impacts affecting other types of inequalities.
For instance, political power is considered as both an end and a means, since in many
cases, political exclusion leads to economic and social inequalities, and at the same time,
poor education leads to poor income and underprivileged social status which undermines
the opportunities for political participation and power sharing benefits (Stewart, 2010).
In other words, the opportunities available for a certain ethnic group to enhance the
group’s capabilities and different capitals, particularly human and social, directly affect
the group’s political power relations and vice versa.
This study relies heavily on the conceptualization of Ostby (2003) to horizontal
inequalities. Throughout the course of this study, the opportunities and capabilities with
the exclusion framework are conceptualized in terms of group’s access to durable
economic assets, education, and employment. The group’s power relations are
conceptualized in terms of political inclusion and access to executive power. The study
thus argues that political inclusion is a function of durable economic assets, education
and employment. This conceptualization is also inspired from the different dimensions of
social exclusion as elaborated in the literature review.
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The study assumes that access to durable economic assets, education and employment
increase entitlement and empowerment, as they help to improve group’s relative
economic and social status, which in turns, increase the likelihood of political inclusion
The main hypotheses that is tested is as follows
H1: Reduced economic assets reduces the probability of political inclusion
H2: Increased access to education increases the probability of political inclusion
H3: Increasing employment increases the probability of political inclusion
Data Sources
The DHS Survey
Since 1984, the DHS has been able to conduct more than 300 surveys in over 90
countries. These surveys have served to provide technical assistance to advance global
understanding of health and population trends in developing countries (DHS Program).
The main purpose of the DHS surveys is to provide countries with the data needed to
monitor and evaluate population, health and nutrition programs on a regular basis. In a
DHS survey, a sample of households is selected throughout the entire country and then
interviewed using a household questionnaire to collect housing characteristics and to
identify all household members and their basic characteristics. Samples vary considerably
in size, ranging from less than 5000 to almost 30000. The surveys are based on clustered
sampling (Vaessen, Thiam, & Lê, 2005). For each dataset the actual country is divided
into between 100 and 521 areas, and 25 households are randomly drawn from each area
(Østby, 2003)
For this study, we rely only on the household questionnaire since it provides basic
information on age, sex, survivorship of the parents and schooling and occupation for
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members of the household. It also provides information on household amenities
(Vaessen, Thiam, & Lê, 2005). Since the DHS surveys offers information on ethnicity,
religion and general welfare on individual bases, it is considered as promising for the
purpose of measuring economic and social horizontal inequalities in terms of
opportunities and capabilities of each ethnic group. “An obvious advantage with survey
data is that one can aggregate the variables, allowing for the construction of descriptive
measures of horizontal inequalities” (Østby, 2003), then combine them with EPR Dataset,
which is described below.
The EPR Dataset
The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups
and their access to state power in all years from 1946 to 2013 (Vogt, Bormann, Rüegger,
Cederman, Hunziker, & Girardin, 2015). In collecting the data, the researched relied on
the expert input of ethnic politics to assess formal and informal degrees of political
participation and exclusion along ethnic lines. An ethnic group is classified as politically
relevant “if at least one political organization claims to represent it in national politics or
if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination”. The power-access
coding is limited to executive power only. “Depending on a given country's power
constellations, executive power amounts to control over the presidency, the cabinet, and
senior posts in the administration, including the army”. Three main categories were used
to differentiate between the different arrangements of access to power. “The first is
whether those who claimed to represent a group's interest held full control of the
executive branch with no meaningful participation by members of any other group”. The
second is “whether they divided power with members of other groups in a power-sharing
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regime”. The third is “whether they were excluded altogether from decision-making
authority within the halls of central state power” (Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010).
Groups that fall into the two first categories are classified as included, whereas those that
belong to the last category are excluded. Furthermore, within each of these categories,
coders were asked to differentiate between further subcategories as follows (Cederman,
Wimmer, & Min, 2010)
1- Included groups that rule alone can be either in monopoly or dominant, depending on
whether the control is total or allows for “token” representation.
2- Included groups that share power play either a senior or junior role, measured by their
absolute influence over the cabinet
3- Excluded groups are powerless (access to power is blocked), discriminated against
(exclusion is systematic and targeted), autonomous (granted regional autonomy), or
separatist (unilaterally secured regional autonomy).
The Sample
The units of this study are ethnic groups-years. The study combines data from the
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset.
The study includes all countries where a DHS survey was undertaken between 1986 and
2014, given that the survey included information on the ethnic affinity or religion
(variables 130 and 131 in the DHS household questionnaire) of the respondents, that
could be mapped onto the cultural marker of the relevant ethnic groups as identified by
the EPR dataset. To conduct the mapping, we compared the groups identified by the DHS
with those identified by the EPR dataset. After the mapping, we ended up with 43
countries and 253 ethnic groups. The number of observations of ethnic groups- year is
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reduced from 561 to 466. Although the time interval is not unified in the sample, we use
time-series analysis and unbalanced panel data. A list of the countries included, along
with years of examination and the relevant ethnic groups studied, is presented in
Appendix 1.
Variables Definition
Dependent Variable
Political Inclusion
Horizontal political inequality is conceptualized in terms of inclusion/exclusion of the
particular ethnic group from access to executive power. We use a dichotomous measure
that captures EPR’s distinction between excluded and included groups as defined above.
We choose the political inclusion as the dependent variable of interest as we believe that
it is the one dimension that has the highest potential of reversing the vicious cycle of
continuous deprivation. In other words, in order to participate in inclusive policymaking
that mediates the effects of discrimination and exclusion, the ethnic group needs to be
represented in the executive power. The variable is measured as dichotomous values
(0,1); 1 indicates political inclusion and 0 political exclusion.
Independent Variables
Economic Relative Deprivation
This variable attempts to measure the level of relative economic deprivation on a scale
from (0,1), where 1 implies relative deprivation, i.e. the group has the lowest share of
household assets compared to the other groups, and 0 implies no relative deprivation, i.e.
the group has the highest relative share of the household assets. It is inversely related to
the share of household assets of each group. The first step to construct this variable is to
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obtain the average total share ratio of durable household assets of each group, with
respect to the other groups within a country. We use the variables v119 to v125, which
identifies whether the household has electricity, has radio, has television, has refrigerator,
has bicycle, has motorcycle and has truck, respectively. For each group, using Excel, we
count the number of respondents who have answered positively to the questions of
possession of each of these assets. Then, to obtain the share of the group for each of the
assets, we divide the number of asset of the particular group, by the total number of this
asset among the total groups within the country. We then sum these ratios for each of the
assets and divide them by 7, the number of assets included in the study, to obtain the
average share of total assets.
For example, the share of asset i of group k equals to the number of respondents who
have asset i in group k divided by the total number of respondents who have asset i in
groups 1,2,k...n where n is the total number of groups within a country.
= ∑

ℎ

⁄ ;

∑

Where M is the number of household assets, j is the index of groups and iis the index of
household assets.
Ostby (2004) used the below equation to compute an index of economic horizontal
inequality (HEI) based on the different household assets in the DHS survey:
= 1 − exp (− ln(
Where M is the number of household assets, and
largest ethnic group that owns asset i and

/

))

refers to the share of group 1, the

refers to the share of group 2. However,

since we are interested in the group level indicators, and since we want to include all

33

groups identified and not only the largest two ethnic groups, we substitute the ratio
∑

by the total share ratio and obtain an index that reflects the relative share of

deprivation of each group. As expected, the relation between the average share of total
assets and the newly computed index at the group level is an inverse relationship as
depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Relationship between Relative Economic Deprivation and Average Total Share Ratio

According to our hypothesis, we expect that the economic deprivation is negatively
affecting the probability of the political inclusion. As the poor or deprived groups remain
on political margins, lack the proper tools to exert pressure to be included in the political
process.
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Modern Occupation Opportunities
The first variable of horizontal social opportunities is conceptualized via the partners’
(men) occupation as recorded in variable 705. The original values recorded by the
respondents are as follows:
In the data set the coding 1 indicates ‘professional, technical, managerial’, 2 indicates
‘Clerical’, 3: ‘Sales’, 4: ‘Agricultural self-employed’ 5: ‘Agricultural employee’, 6:
‘Household & domestic’, 7: ‘Services’ 8: ‘Skilled Manual’, 9: ‘Unskilled Manual’ 96:
‘Other’, 98: ‘Don’t know’. Following Ostby (2003) approach, we have conceptualized
the different responses into two categories: with modern occupation and without modern
occupation. The rationale behind such categorizations is twofold. First, the modern
categories are assumed to be the highest paying occupations, which presumably enable a
sense of entitlement and empowerment. Second, they are assumed to closer to the urbancentral categorization, which is expected to increase the likelihood of political inclusion,
as opposed to the rural-peripheral categorization. The first category includes professional,
technical and managerial, clerical, and skilled manual. The other responses were
categorized as without modern occupation, while deleting the responses of ‘other’ and
‘don’t know’. For each group, using Excel, we count the number of respondents for each
category. In some of the models, as will be shown shortly, each category is used
separately in absolute numbers, while in others, an aggregated value of group’s men
share of modern occupation is computed along the same line as the total economic assets
share. Our hypothesis is as employment opportunities in modern occupations increases
the probability of the political inclusion increases. The skilled and employed marginal
groups are likely exerting pressure, teaming up to open the political space.
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Education Opportunities
The second variable of horizontal social opportunities is operationalized via the education
of women as recorded in variable 106 in the DHS surveys. There are four categories of
response for the question of education of women. These categories are: no education,
primary, secondary and higher, or don’t know. The last response was omitted. For each
group, using Excel, we count the number of respondents for each category. In some of the
models, each category of education: primary, secondary and higher, is used separately in
absolute numbers, however, in others, an aggregated value of group women’s education
share is computed, in which the three last categories are grouped together and the share of
each group’s access to education is obtained.
Our hypothesis is as educational access increases the probability of the political inclusion
increases. The educated groups are likely to be more equipped for political inclusion.
Statistical Model: Logistic Regression
Given that the dependent variable is a dichotomous binary value of 0/1, we use the
logistic regression to conduct the analysis. The logistic model is as follows:
= ( = 1| ) =

1+

1

(

)

For ease of exposition, the equation is written as follows
=
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=

+
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;

We use STATA 10 software to conduct the analysis.
The major challenge faced while carrying out the data analysis was the limited number of
observations. In many cases, there were missing data either in one or more of the
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household assets responses. In these cases, the relative economic deprivation index was
not computed as we attempted to unify the equation used in Excel for computations. In
other instances, the DHS surveys were missing data on educational level of women or
occupations of men. For STATA to be able to estimate the regression, it requires that a
value is present for all variables for a case to be included in the equation. This has
resulted in the reduction of total number of observations from 561 to 364 observations.
Data Summary
Table 1: Data Summary of Variables Used in the Analysis

Variable

Observations Mean

Min

Max

0.6502146
0.8272313

Std.
Deviation
0.4774146
0. 1931606

Included
Relative
Economic
Deprivation
Agriculture
Men
Clerical
Men
Skilled Men
Professional
Men
Modern
Occupation
Men Share
Primary
Women
Secondary
Women
Higher
Education
Women
Education
Women
Share

466
483

0
0.0200437

1
0.9996342

512

1764.313

2454.267

0

16467

512

101.2129

276.3845

0

3239

512
512

612.5703
372.6738

1364.022
1012.974

0
0

16739
12649

500

0.182566

0.207374

0

0.983228

561

1135.07

1937.397

0

14316

561

718.4973

1947.412

0

26869

561

107.4545

388.9808

0

6213

561

0.1786466

0.2155936

0

0.9807889
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Chapter 4: Empirical Results
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, the development and logical
flow of modeling and the steps undertaken to reach the final model that tests the
hypothesis inclusively are included. In the second section, we attempt to carry out a
robustness check by reducing the number of observations and estimate the most
important variables.
In the first models, we test the relationship between relative economic deprivation and the
modern occupation categories and political inclusion. In some of the models, we add a
category of agriculture occupation in an attempt to compare between modern and nonmodern occupations.
In model 1, we examine the effect of relative economic deprivation and modern
occupations on the probability of inclusion. We use an aggregate term for the modern
occupation categories and employ the variable of modern occupation men share as
elaborated in the research design section. Both variables of relative economic deprivation
and share of modern occupations of men are significant but both have negative signs. For
a better understanding of the negative sign of modern occupation share of men, we
disaggregate modern occupations into its different categories in model 2-4
In Model 2, the relative economic deprivation is significant and has the expected negative
relationship with political inclusion. As for the professional category of modern
occupations, it is significant and has the expected positive relationship with political
inclusion. The last variable included in this model is clerical occupation, which is
significant but has a negative relationship with political inclusion.
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Referring to Table 2, in Model 3, we add the agriculture occupation. The three variables
included in Model 2 behave in the same way. As for the agriculture occupation, it is
significant and has the expected negative relationship with political inclusion.
In Model 4, we add the category of the Skilled Manual, which is considered as a modern
occupation. The variables pertaining to the agriculture and professional occupations loose
their significance. The variable of relative economic deprivation behaves in the same way
as Model 1 and 2 and 3. The new variable of skilled occupation is significant and has a
positive relationship with political inclusion. As for the clerical occupation, it is
significant but again with a negative sign. We therefore conclude that the negative sign of
modern occupation variable in Model 1 pertains to the negative effect of the clerical
position in the different following models. A summary of models 1-4 is shown in Table 2
Table 2: Summary Models 1-4

Model 1
-75.2865
(-4.87)****

Relative
Economic
Deprivation
Professional ------------Men
Clerical
------------Men
Skilled Men ------------

Model 2
-14.41125
(-2.48)**

Model 3
-12.08019
(-2.47)**

Model 4
-18.77388
(-3.24)****

0.0018305
(1.63)*
-0.0063972
(-1.96)**
--------------

0.0043822
(2.67)***
-0.0006018
(-2.74)*
-------

0.0022601
(1.17)
-0.0118382
(-2.71)***
0.0025498
(1.72)***
-0.0002802
(-1.10)
-------

Agriculture -----------------------0.006018
Men
(-2.74)***
Modern
-58.45421
-------------------Occupation (-4.53)****
Men Share
*p≤0.1;**p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01; ****p≤0.001, (z statistic in parentheses)
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We now start to insert the variables of women education and explore the effect of the
different educational levels on political inclusion.
In model 5, we add to model 1 the aggregate variable of education share of women. The
three variables are significant, both relative economic deprivation and modern occupation
have a negative relationship with political inclusion, whereas education share has a
positive relationship, as expected.
In Model 6, we start to disaggregate the term of education share into the different
categories, primary, secondary and higher. The variable of primary education is
significant and has a positive sign as expected. In model 7 we add secondary education of
women to model 6, but the newly added variable is not of statistic significance. In model
8, we add the higher education, but again, the newly added variable is not of statistic
significance. A summary of the models 5-8 is presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Summary of Models 5-8

Relative
Economic
Deprivation
Modern
Occupation
Men Share

Model 5
46.00078
(-2.07)**
64.11707
(2.56)***
------

Model 6
-38.32028
(-2.42)**

Model 7
-39.21505
(-3.09)***

Model 8
-38.4679
(-2.79)***

-32.71963
(-2.03**

-35.10447
(-2.89)***

-34.49865
(-2.55)**

Primary
0.001509
0.0009707
0.0009723
Women
(2.70)***
(2.28)**
(1.75)*
Secondary
-----------0.0002638
-0.000351
Women
(0.55)
(-0.39)
Higher
----------------0.0050473
Women
(0.80)
Education
45.25881 -----------------Women
(1.98)**
Share
*p≤0.1; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01; ****p≤0.001, (z statistic in parentheses)
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According to model 5,, the negative effect of relative economic deprivation on the
probability of inclusion is depicted in Figure 2. This is obtained by examining the
marginal effect of a change in units of Relative Economic Deprivation by 0.1 (X-axis)
(X
on
the predicted probability of inclusion (Y
(Y-axis)

Figure 2:: Predictive Margins Effect of Relative Economic Deprivation on
Probability of Inclusion

As for the negative effect of modern occupation share on the probability of inclusion, it is
shown in Figure 3. This is obtained by examining the marginal effect of a change in units
of the share of men’s modern occupation by 0.1(X
0.1(X-axis)
axis) on the predicted probability of
inclusion (Y-axis)
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Figure 3:: Predictive Margins Effect of Modern Occupation Share on Probability
of Inclusion

The positive effect of education share on the probability of political iinclusion
nclusion is depicted
in Figure 4. This is obtained by examining the marginal effect of a change in units of the
share of women’s education by 0.1(X
0.1(X-axis)
axis) on the predicted probability of inclusion (Y(Y
axis)

Figure 4:: Predictive Margins Effect of Education Share on Probability of
Inclusion
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Robustness Check
In order to carry out a simple robustness check, we first reduce the number of
observations by 5% and 15% and estimate model 5 in models 5a and 5b respectively. The
reason for choosing this model for the robustness check is that it is the holistic model that
serves to test for the different hypotheses of this study.
Table 4: Robustness Check Model 5

Relative
Economic
Deprivation
Modern
Occupation
Men Share
Education
Women Share

Model 5a
N=339
-33.87247
(-2.53)***

Model 5b
N=306
-28.68785
(-1.92)*

-50.38192
(-3.06)***

-66.82941
(-3.98)****

28.6731
(1.99)**

52.79047
(4.45)****

*p≤0.1; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01; ****p≤0.001, (z statistic in parentheses)
From these two estimates, we conclude that model 5 is a robust model, since none of the
variables change its sign or looses statistic significance, as shown in Table 4.
A second robustness check is carried out, in which we substitute the absolute numbers of
the variables in Models 2-4 and 6-8 by the relative share of each of the ethnic groups to
the examined variable, in an attempt to account for the group size effect.
Robustness check of models 2-4 is presented in Table 5, while the robustness check
results of models 6-8 are presented in Table 6.
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Table 5: Robustness Check Models 2-4

Relative
Economic
Deprivation
Professional
Men Share
Clerical
Men Share

Model 2a
-19.19473
(-2.00)**

Model 3a
-14.72309
(-1.39)

Model 4a
-9.450591
(-0.99)

1.770589
(-0.78)
-4.135654
(-0.78)

8.322418
(0.79)
-7.065769
(-1.27)

4.628678
(0.55)
-0.5073303
(-0.10)

-------

-6.889683
(-1.58)
-1.02739
(-0.20)

Skilled Men -------------Share
Agriculture -------------Men Share

5.873665
(1.10)

*p≤0.1; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01; ****p≤0.001, (z statistic in parentheses)
Table 6: Robustness Check Models 6-8

Model 6a
-21.93903
(-3.32)****

Model 7a Model 8a
Relative
-65.70827 -68.34525
Economic
((Deprivation
4.58)**** 4.63)****
Modern
-30.18818
-70.95967 -66.48496
Occupation (-4.44)****
((Men Share
4.27)**** 3.99)****
Primary
12.88059(3.38)**** 6.291959 3.130824
Women
(0.90)
(0.32)
Share
Secondary ------14.72075 0.2632835
Women
(1.54)
(0.02)
Share
Higher
-----------6.156725
Women
(0.345)
Share
*p≤0.1; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01; ****p≤0.001, (z statistic in parentheses)
From these estimates, we conclude that the models 6-8 are more robust than models 2-4.
Many of these variables loose their statistic significance when computed in relative share
terms. This could be due to the fact that the newly computed variables of relative share
are very close to each other that patterns of change are not noticeable.
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Evaluation of Hypothesis
Table 7 shows the summary of the hypothesis support evaluation.
Table 7: Evaluation of Hypothesis

Relative Economic
Deprivation reduces the
probability of political
inclusion
Increased opportunities and
capabilities in terms of
modern occupation
increases the probability of
political inclusion
Increased opportunities and
capabilities in terms of
education increases the
probability of political
inclusion
Findings Discussion

Supported
X

Not Supported

X

X

From these different models, we find that deprivation of wealth assets always reduce the
likelihood of political inclusion. This conclusion has an intuitive appeal since to get
engaged in the political sphere, and to be influential in it with its liberal representative
form, this requires strong political organization and broad influence and proliferation,
which requires substantial material and organizational resources.
As for modern occupation, as modeled in this study, it reduces the likelihood of political
inclusion, especially the clerical positions. However, it has to be noted, as reflected by
model 2 and 3, that the professional and skilled manual occupations are positively related
to political inclusion. We conclude from these positive relations that these two
occupational categories matter more for political inclusion, as professional occupations
could be considered as closely related to business and ruling elites, and skilled manual
close to workers and labor unions. As for the clerical position, which has a powerful
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negative effect on the aggregation term of modern occupation, we conclude that those
who occupy this position do not have the interest or motivation to participate in the
executive power. Since clerical position is mostly a middle class position, most probably
they are not willing to sacrifice their stability and pay the costs attributed to political
inclusion. They can secure their interests with their incomes instead. This demotivation
could also be related to perceived corruption and low returns of political inclusion.
The models also reflect a positive relation between education and political inclusion,
specifically, primary education. This could be attributed to the fact that primary education
in low and middle income countries has the highest returns on investment, as opposed to
high income countries, which have higher returns from secondary and tertiary education
(Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004)
Generally, we find strong evidence that the different dimensions of horizontal inequalities
Methodological Limitations
There are certain limitations associated with the methodology adopted throughout this
research. First, there are some definitional limitations to political inclusion, constrained
by the EPR dataset. As a result, this research adopts only the formulistic definition of
state inclusion and disregards inclusion in the general polity beyond the central state. As
a result, other spheres where political inclusion matters greatly are ignored, such as civil
society for instance (Dryzek, 1996).
Second, there are certain limitations associated with the quantitative approach adopted
and the use of global data, which results into the absence of an in-depth analysis to the
different patterns, if any, of changes and fluctuations in terms of inclusion/exclusion of
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the different ethnic groups within the examined countries, or in terms of their access to
the different opportunities, including the durable assets, education and employment.
Furthermore, the limitations employed by the use of DHS surveys constraint the
conclusions reached to developing countries, and limit comparisons between developed
versus developing countries.
Finally, due to the limited number of time variant observations, we were unable to use
lagged-dependent variables.
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Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks
The main goal of this study has been to investigate the relationship existing between the
different dimensions of horizontal inequalities, which lead to the social exclusion of
certain ethnic groups in multi-ethnic societies. To test this interrelation, we decided to
examine the effect of the different capabilities and opportunities, namely access to
durable assets, education and occupation, on political inclusion and participation in the
executive power. We carried out the analysis at the group level. From the empirical
analysis, we were able to show that deprivation of wealth assets always reduce the
likelihood of political inclusion. In addition, the increased share of education among a
certain ethnic group increases the probability of its political inclusion. The hypothesis
claiming that increased opportunities in terms of market entitlements and occupation
would increase the probability of political inclusion was not supported in the different
models. However, this relationship is only understood when we disaggregate modern
occupation into the different types of occupations, showing positive relation between
some of these occupations and inclusion (professional and skilled manual) while negative
relation in other positions (clerical). As for non-modern occupations, like agriculture,
they were negatively associated with political inclusion. These results serve to prove that
identity matters for inclusion/exclusion along the different dimensions, namely political,
economic and social, in low and middle-income countries as differential access to the
different resources create further cleavages between the different ethnic groups.
Implications for future research
Despite the fact that this study has developed some simple indicators of horizontal
inequalities in terms of access to durable assets, opportunities of education and
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employment, the data was limited in number due to the limited number of countries,
mostly developed countries, in which the DHS surveys was carried out. Furthermore, it
was limited by the presence of data on ethnicity and/or religion in the DHS
questionnaires and the mapping between the groups identified in the DHS and those
identified in the EPR dataset. Future research should imply the incorporation of other
surveys to obtain measures on horizontal inequalities, such as the Afrobarometer and the
World Value Surveys. Having more observations for more countries would help in
reaching more generalized conclusions.
In addition, the study has relied on the shares of each group with respect to the different
dimensions, which is a general simplification to the measurement of horizontal
inequalities. Future research should imply more refined operationalization of the different
dimensions of inequalities and the incorporation of the relative group size.
Moreover, future research should involve the employment of more control variables that
contribute to the dimensions of horizontal inequalities, including variables pertaining to
vertical inequalities and GDP and population, etc.…
Finally, future research should address the issue of reverse causation, i.e., the impact of
political inclusion/exclusion on the socio-economic opportunities. However, this requires
the use of more instrumental variables beyond the scope of this study
Policy Recommendations
The interrelation between the different dimensions of horizontal inequalities that was
shown in this study, particularly economic and political inequality, gives insight on the
need to develop more comprehensive policies with more effective targeting. Corrective
measures should incorporate actions on all levels, political, economic and social. Such
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measures could be interpreted as a form of affirmative action. “This is action taken
towards the allocation of political and/or economic entitlements on the basis of
membership of specific groups, for the purpose of increasing the specified groups’ share
of entitlements” (Stewart, 2005)
On the economic level, there is a need for more government interventions and regulations
that guarantee fair competition over the scarce resources. More public investment is
required to reduce the relative level of deprivation between the different ethnic groups
within a society. Stewart (2002) also proposes group distribution requirements imposed
on the private sector in the form of shares of different groups in employment; credit
allocation and so on. On the social level, more attention should be paid to education
policies. Positive discrimination policies in the form of quotas for each group are possible
solution. However, it has to be noted that such policies increase the salience of group
boundaries and it preferable that they are implemented for a short period of time before
the implementation of a more integrative educational policy that ensure the rights and
access to education for all members of a society (Stewart, 2010). As for the political
level, there is a need for more inclusivity. As stated by Stewart (2002), “the
monopolization of political power by one group or another is often responsible for many
of the other inequalities, and for violent reactions because this appears the only way to
change the system”. In ethnically divided societies, there is a strong tendency for political
parties to represent and argue for particular ethnicities and neglect others. There is
therefore a need for a constrained democracy, designed to ensure an inclusive system.
Features of a constrained democracy include among others: strong human rights
provisions to protect all groups; requirements that members of each group participate in
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government; job allocations to different groups; decentralization of government so that
power sharing occurs (Stewart, 2002).
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Appendix 1
ID
1
2
3
4

Country
Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Benin

Ethnic Groups
Albanian, Greek, Macedoni
Armenian, Russian
Arebaij, Lesgin
Adja, Bariba, Dendi, Fon, Peulh,
Yoa, Yoruba
Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists

Cameroon
Central Africa
Chad

Years
2008
2000
2006
1996, 2001, 2006,
2011
1993, 1996, 1999,
2004, 2007, 2011
1998, 2004, 2011
1994
1996, 2004

5

Bangladesh

6
7
8
9

Congo

2005

10

Egypt

11

Ethiopia

1992, 1995, 2005,
2008, 2014
2000, 2005, 2011

Bakondo, Bateke, Babembe,
Balari, Mbosi
Muslim, Christian

12
13

Gabon
Gambia

2000, 2012
2013

14

Ghana

1998

15
16

Guinea
Kazakestan

1999, 2005, 2012
1995

17
18

Kyrgistan
Kenya

1997
1989, 1993, 1998,
2003, 2009, 2014

19

Liberia

1986, 2013

20

Malawi

2000, 2004, 2010

21

Mali

22

Moldova

1987, 1995, 2001,
2006,
2012
2005

23

Mozambique

1997, 2011
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Bamilike, Beti
Ngbaka, Yakoma, Sara
Arabic, Hadjarai, Sara

Amharra, Affar, Oromo, Tigray,
Somalie, Gumuz, Harrari, Anyiwak
Fang, Myene, Mbede-te
Creole/AkuMarabout,
Fula/Tukulur/
Lorobo, Madinka/Jajanka, Wollof
Ewe, Akan, Molo-Dagbani,
Ga-Adangbe, Grussi
Soussou, Malinke, Peulh
Kazakh, Russian, Uigur, German,
Uzbek, Tatar
Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Russian, Uigur
Kalenjin, Kamba, Kikuyu,
Meru/Embu, Kisii, Luhya, Luo,
Mijikenda/Sawahili, Somalie,
Gio, Kpelle, Krahn, Kru,
Mandingo, Mano
Chewa, Tumbuka, Tonga, Nkonde,
Lomwe, Amanganja/Anyanja, Yao,
Peulh
Bulgarian, Moldovan, Russian,
Gagauzan
Xitson, Chona, Cichopi,
Shimakonde, Ciyao

24

Namibia

1992, 2000

25

Nepal

2011

26

Niger

1992, 1998, 2006

27

Nigeria

2008, 2010

28
29
30

Pakistan
Rwanda
Senegal

31

Sierra Leone

2007
1992
1986, 1992, 1997,
2005, 2010
2008, 2013

32

South Africa

1998

33

Sri Lanka

1987

34

Togo

1988, 2013

35
36

Turkey
Uganda

1993
1995, 2011

37

Uzbekstan

1996

38

Vietnam

1997, 2002

39

Zambia

1992, 1996, 2001,
2007, 2013

40
41
42
43

Bolivia
Brazil
Guatemala
Hounduras

2003
1991, 1996
1987
2011
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Trinidad

1987
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Oshivamb, Herero, San, Damara,
Kavango
Hill Janajati, Hill Dalit, Newar,
Terai Janajati, Muslim, Terai Dalit
Djerma, Haoussa, Peulh, Kanouri,
Touareg
Tiv, Ijaw, Hausa, Fulani, Igbo,
Yorouba
Punjabi, Pushto, Balochi
Hutu, Tutsi
Wolof, Poular, Serer, Mandinge,
Diola
Mende, Temne, Limba, Kono,
Kriole
White, Colored, Black/African,
Asian/Indian
Low-Sinhalese, Indian-Tamil, Sri
Lankan-Moor, Up-Sinhalese, Sri
Lankan-Tamil
Adja-Ewe, Kabje-Tem, ParaGourra,
199
Langi, Acholi, Basoga, Baganda,
Iteso, Kakwa, Alur, Nubiam, Madi,
Lihbara, Karimojong,
Banyankole, Banyoro,
Banyarwanda
Uzbek, Karakaplak, Russian,
Tadzikh
Tay, Dao, Thai, Chinese, Khmer,
Nung, Vietnamese, Muong
Bemba, Tonga, Nyanja, Baroste,
North-western, Lozi, Lunda,
Luvale, Kaonde
Quecha, Aymara, Guarani
White, Black
ladino
Garifuna, Lenca, Maya-Chorti,
Misquito, Tawaka (sumo), Pech
(paya), Nahoa
African, Indian
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